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WHAT'S WRONG WITH THE SAFE HARBOR
FOR FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS? A
CALL TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION TO RECONSIDER CODIFICATION
OF THE BESPEAKS CAUTION DOCTRINE
I. INTRODUCTION
Each year, approximately 300 lawsuits are filed under the federal
securities laws and almost ninety-three percent settle out of court at an
average cost of $8.6 million. The cost of those suits to corporate
America totals over $2.5 billion per year. Many of these lawsuits are
filed by "professional" plaintiffs and take the form of class-action
"strike" suits. These suits simply allege federal securities law violations
and are intended to induce the defendant to settle out of court rather
than incur the enormous cost of litigation.2 Despite the federal securi-
ties laws' underlying goal of encouraging securities issuers to disclose
information to the investing public,3 issuers have been justifiably reluc-
tant to make certain kinds of disclosures due to the threat of frivolous
litigation.
Particularly vulnerable to fraud allegations under the securities laws
are disclosures of predictive, forward-looking, or "soft" information.5 If
the predictions do not materialize, all parties involved in the making of
the predictive statement may be susceptible to claims under the catch-
all antifraud provisions of the securities laws: Section 10(b)6 of the Secu-
1. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 33 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679,711.
2. Id. at 4, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 683. See generally Janet Cooper Alexan-
der, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L.
REV. 497,511-13 (1991).
3. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 5, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 684 ("The hallmark of
our securities laws is broad, timely disclosure to investors of information about the financial
condition of publicly traded companies.").
4. Donald C. Langevoort, Disclosures that "Bespeak Caution," 49 Bus. LAW. 481, 499
(1994) ("The tendency for investors to bring lawsuits when events turn out far less optimisti-
cally than expected naturally dampens the incentive of promoters to include the projec-
tions.").
5. "Soft" information includes "statements of subjective analysis or extrapolation, such
as opinions, motives, and intentions, or forward-looking statements, such as projections, es-
timates, and forecasts." In re Craftmatic Sec. Litig., 890 F.2d 628, 642 (3d Cir. 1989).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1996).
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rities and Exchange Act of 1934f ("Exchange Act") and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder.8 By nature, forward-looking statements in-
herently have some degree of unreliability,9 and to allow disappointed
investors to sue each time such statements do not materialize would
burden issuers and the courts, as well as place unreasonable expecta-
tions on those involved in the drafting of disclosure documents. Be-
cause forward-looking information typically is useful to potential inves-
tors in evaluating a company's economic prospects,0 steps needed to be
taken to protect issuers from strike suits and to encourage the disclo-
sure of valuable forward-looking information.
Recent history has revealed that the courts have decreased their tol-
erance for strike suits brought under Rule 10b-5 by plaintiff-investors
claiming that they were misled by forward-looking statements that did
not materialize. Federal courts, in all but one circuit, have adopted a
version of the bespeaks caution doctrine" as a tool to dispose of such
suits. The doctrine allows the courts to grant a defendant's motion to
dismiss or motion for summary judgment if the forward-looking state-
ments at issue were accompanied by adequate cautionary language
which either rendered the statements immaterial as a matter of law, or
were of such a nature that an investor's reliance on the forward-looking
7. Id. § 78a et. seq..
8. Rule 10b-5 creates a private cause of action based on material misstatements or
omissions. It provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly ... to make any untrue
statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading ... in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1996). A plaintiff must not only plead an omission or misstatement,
but also reasonable reliance and scienter. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S.
375, 382 (1983); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
9. See In re Healthcare Compare Sec. Litig., 75 F.3d 276, 281 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting
Azarie v. Mullane, 2 F.3d 1456, 1468 (7th Cir. 1993)) (noting that projections are inevitably
inaccurate because things almost never go exactly as planned).
10. Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements, Securities Act Release No. 7101,
[1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 85,436, at 85,778 (Oct. 13, 1994)
[hereinafter "Safe Harbor Release"].
11. See Grossman v. Novell, Inc., 120 F.3d 1112, 1121 (10th Cir. 1997); Harden v. Raf-
fensperger Hughes & Co., 65 F.3d 1392, 1404-06 (7th Cir. 1995); Saltzberg v. TM Ster-
ling/Austin Assocs., 45 F.3d 399, 400 (11th Cir. 1995); In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35
F.3d 1407, 1414 (9th Cir. 1994), Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 167 (5th Cir. 1994); In re
Donald J. Trump Casino Sec., 7 F.3d 357, 364 (3d Cir. 1993); Sinay v. Lamson & Sessions
Co., 948 F.2d 1037, 1040 (6th Cir. 1991); cf. Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 639 (6th Cir.
1993); I. Meyer Pincus & Assocs., P.C. v. Oppenheimer & Co., 936 F.2d 759, 763 (2d Cir.
1991); Romani v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 929 F.2d 875, 879 (1st Cir. 1991); Polin v. Con-
ductron Corp., 552 F.2d 797, 806 n.28 (8th Cir. 1977).
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statements would not be considered reasonable. The judiciary has
shown its eagerness to further develop the doctrine; however, recent
developments in Congress may have thrown a wrench into the judici-
ary's efforts.
Congress, like the judiciary, has shown that it is concerned about
frivolous securities lawsuits that have a "muzzling effect" on corporate
management. 2 The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995"s
("Reform Act"), built from a proposal by two senators, 14 traveled down
a "[long and [w]inding [r]oad"' 5 before reaching its final form. On De-
cember 22, 1995, as part of "the most momentous event in the history of
securities litigation since the adoption of the Securities Acts in 1933 and
1934,"'I6 and over President Clinton's first veto,17 the Reform Act be-
came law. One of the most hotly debated provisions of the Reform Act
was the new safe harbor for forward-looking statements.18 This provi-
sion sought to encourage issuers to voluntarily disclose information by
providing them with protection from litigation if the standards of the
safe harbor were met.9 While the safe harbor's roots are in the judi-
cially-created bespeaks caution doctrine,20 the Conference Committee
made clear that it did "not intend for the safe harbor provisions to re-
place the judicial 'bespeaks caution' doctrine or to foreclose further de-
velopment of that doctrine by the courts."'"
Although Congress promulgated the safe harbor as part of its efforts
to thwart vexatious litigation,2 it may have in effect invited litigation on
other grounds,2 particularly litigation to test the interpretation of the
12. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 5 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679,684.
13. Pub. L. No. 104-67,109 Stat. 737 (1995).
14. Senators Pete Domenici and Chris Dodd introduced S. 240, 104th Cong. (1995) on
January 18, 1995. While this legislation took only eleven months to become law, it under-
went significant debate in the House and Senate. For a brief but comprehensive discussion
of the debate, see John W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform: The Long and Winding Road
to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,51 Bus. LAWv. 335,337 (1996).
15. Avery, supra note 14.
16. HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, PRIVATE SECURITIEs LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF
1995: SPECIAL UPDATE § 1.01 (Clark, Boardman Callaghan 1996).
17. See text accompanying infra notes 85-88.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2 (1996).
19. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 16, (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 695.
20. Id. at 17, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 679, 696; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369,
at 43 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 731,742.
21. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, at 46, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,745.
22. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 15-16, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679,694-95.
23. See Margaret A. Jacobs & Edward Felsenthal, New Securities Bill May Prompt
More Questions Than It Answers, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 1995, at B2; Avery, supra note 14, at
1997]
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legislation's ambiguous language.' In addition, Congress may have
muddied the waters the judiciary was in the process of exploring. This
Comment asserts that the new safe harbor, while a congressional mile-
stone and a welcome provision for issuers, needs to be further clarified
in light of the bespeaks caution doctrine in order to provide a uniform
standard that is useful to both issuers and investors.
This Comment first discusses the development of the judicially-
created bespeaks caution doctrine and its current status in the courts.
Part III then discusses the protections provided by the Congressionally-
created safe harbor for forward-looking statements. Part IV compares
the judicial doctrine with the legislative safe harbor. Finally, Part V
suggests that the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") should
consider changes that would minimize the safe harbor's ambiguity and
codify the bespeaks caution doctrine to give the courts a single uniform
mechanism to dispose of non-meritorious suits brought by disappointed
investors who claim they were misled by forward-looking information
that did not materialize.
II. THE JUDICIALLY-CREATED BESPEAKS CAUTION DOCTRINE
A. The Need for Protection
Before 1978, the SEC did not allow issuers to include projections in
documents filed with the SEC due to a fear that unsophisticated inves-
tors would rely on information that was "inherently unreliable."z After
evaluating the SEC's disclosure policies in existence in the 1970s, the
Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure urged the SEC to take
action to encourage issuers to disclose forward-looking information.2
337.
24. The terms "meaningful," "important," and "accompany" have received the most
criticism for their ambiguity. See, e.g., Avery, supra note 14, at 337; Carl W. Schneider & Jay
A. Dubow, Forward-Looking Information-Navigating in the Safe Harbor, 51 Bus. LAv.
1071, 1089-95 (1996).
25. Safe Harbor Release, [1994-95 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,436,
at 85,779.
26. The Advisory Committee announced this general recommendation on November 3,
1977, along with specific recommendations of how the SEC should accomplish this goal. See
Id. 85, 780-81. The Committee recommended that a safe harbor be adopted that would
provide protection to forward-looking statements made with a reasonable basis and in good
faith. Id. This recommendation was aimed toward all issuer statements, not solely those that
were included in SEC filings. Id. Furthermore, the Committee opined that this safe harbor
be available to all registrants and that cautionary language be required to be included with
the projections as to clearly indicate the nature of the projection and warn investors not to
rely heavily on those projections. Id. The Committee suggested that these disclosures be
[Vol. 81:133
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Almost two years later, the SEC heeded parts of the Advisory Commit-
tee's recommendations and adopted Rule 175.27  Unfortunately, this
rule never had a profound effect?
The development of the bespeaks caution doctrine came as a result
of a perceived lack of guidance from the SEC regarding disclosure of
assumptions and risk factors in the context of forward-looking state-
ments and a firm's liability for such disclosure.29 In response to this per-
ceived lack of guidance, and to protect issues from frivolous lawsuits,30
the courts developed a doctrine based on the application of two basic
concepts of securities law: materiality and reliance.3' As a general mat-
ter, the doctrine "provides a mechanism by which a court can rule as a
matter of law ... that defendants' forward-looking representations con-
tained enough cautionary language or risk disclosure to protect the de-
fendant against claims of securities fraud."'32
Although the phrase "bespeak caution" first appeared in a footnote
of a 1977 Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, Polin v. Conductron
Corp.,33 the doctrine was not firmly established until almost ten years
later by the Second Circuit in Luce v. Edelstein.' It was not until five
encouraged, but not required, and that if such disclosures were made, there should be no
duty to update the projections. See id. 1 85,780-82. Id.
27. 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1996). Rule 175 protects forward-looking statements which are
material and turn out to be untrue or misleading. See Id. In order to be protected, the
statements must have been made with a reasonable basis and disclosed in good faith.
28. See generally, John M. Olivieri, Note, Liability for Forward-Looking Statements: The
Securities and Exchange Commission's Ambiguous Stance, 1993 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 221,
Safe Harbor Release, [1994-95 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,436 at 85, 786-
88 (criticisms of the commission's safe harbor).
29. LOuis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 2079 n.414 (Supp. 1996
at 533) (3d ed. 1990 & Supp. 1996).
30. See Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 167 (5th Cir. 1994) ("The 'bespeaks caution'
doctrine ... reflects a relatively recent ... evolution in securities law driven by the increase in
and the unique nature of fraud actions based on predictive statements." (footnotes omitted));
In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407, 1415 (9th Cir. 1994), cert denied, 116 S. Ct.
277 (1995) ("In our view, the bespeaks caution doctrine helps 'to minimize the chance that a
plaintiff with a largely groundless claim will bring a suit and conduct extensive discovery in
the hopes of obtaining an increased settlement."' (quoting Romani v. Shearson Lehman Hut-
ton, 929 F.2d 875, 878 (1st Cir. 1991)).
31. Worlds of Wonder, 35 F.3d at 1414.
32. Langevoort, supra note 4, at 482-83.
33. 552 F.2d 797, 806 n.28 (8th Cir. 1977). The court noted that the language in Con-
ductron's Annual Report of expectations and possibilities "besp[oke] caution in outlook and
f[ell] far short of the assurances required for a finding of falsity and fraud." Id.
34. 802 F.2d 49 (2nd Cir. 1986). In Luce, the doctrine was used to affirm the dismissal
of clams brought under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act which alleged that
a Private Placement Offering Memorandum contained intentional misrepresentations about
potential tax and cash benefits of the underlying security. Id. at 56. The court, citing Polin,
1997]
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years after Luce that the doctrine became a popular tool used by the
courts when granting a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary
judgment. Since the early part of this decade, eight additional circuits
have adopted versions of the bespeaks caution doctrine with consider-
able variations,35 and while the doctrine itself has not yet been before
the Supreme Court, lower courts have asserted that the Court implicitly
has accepted its logic.36
B. Scope of the Doctrine's Protection
The bespeaks caution doctrine has been used to grant motions to
dismiss and motions for summary judgment in cases brought under sec-
tions 1117 and 12(2)38 of the Securities Act of 1933"9 ("Securities Act")
and, most often, cases brought under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of
the Exchange Act.A° Defendants in such suits typically are the issuer, its
officers and directors, and underwriters and accountants who played a
role in the issuer's registration with the SEC, or in the dissemination of
information to investors.
The bespeaks caution doctrine can apply to statements made in of-
fering documents for initial public offerings,42 secondary offerings,4' pri-
stated that "[w]e are not inclined to impose liability on the basis of statements that clearly
'bespeak caution."' Id. The court concluded that the Offering Memorandum clearly con-
veyed that the projections of potential tax and cash benefits were speculative and that it gave
no assurance that the benefits would be realized. Id.
35. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
36. It has been asserted that the Court's observation in Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v.
Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1097-98 (1991), that inconsistencies between true and misleading
statements may render the misleading statement immaterial was an implicit acceptance of
the doctrine's logic. See, e.g., United States v. Morris, 80 F.3d 1151, 1167-68 (7th Cir. 1996);
Harden v. Raffensperger Hughes & Co., 65 F.3d 1392, 1405 nn.9-10 (7th Cir. 1995); Fecht v.
Price Co., 70 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 1995); In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d
357, 372 (3d Cir. 1993). But see Langevoort, supra note 4, at 489-91.
37. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1996) (creates a private cause of action for misstatements or
omissions of material fact in the registration statement).
38. Id. § 771(a)(2) (creates a private cause of action for purchasers for misstatements or
omissions of material fact in a prospectus or oral statement involving an offer or sale of a se-
curity).
39. l. § 77a et. seq.
40. See supra note 8. A plaintiff must not only plead an omission or misstatement, but
also reasonable reliance and scienter. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375,
382 (1983); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
41. See generally cases cited supra note 11.
42. See, e.g., In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 814 F. Supp. 850 (N.D. Cal. 1993),
aff'd, 35 F.3d 1407 (9th Cir. 1994).
43. E.g., Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160 (5th Cir. 1994).
THE BESPEAKS CAUTION DOCTRINE
vate placements," limited partnerships,45 as well as statements made in
documents attached to offering materials." Some courts have also ap-
plied the doctrine to publicly-made statements47 and others have used it
in controversial "fraud on the market" cases." It can be used to protect
omissions as well as misstatements, 9 although not all courts agree that
the doctrine should apply to omissions.5
The doctrine's scope is not limited to protecting those involved with
making statements in Securities or Exchange Act documents. It has
been expanded in at least one case to protect a fund manager and prin-
cipal underwriter of a closed-end investment fund registered pursuant
to the Investment Company Act of 1940." One of the most important
aspects of the doctrine's scope is that it only applies to forward-looking
statements, not to statements of current or historical facts.' Thus, one
cannot omit known or misstate which factors may affect the future of a
prediction and later claim protection under the doctrine based on cau-
tionary language.
The Fourth Circuit has applied the broadest approach to the be-
speaks caution doctrine holding that unless forward-looking informa-
tion is worded as a guarantee, it is not actionable under the federal se-
curities laws.53 It is clear that this per se approach has little chance of
being embraced by any other circuit, as most other courts minimally re-
quire cautionary language specifically tailored to warn the investor
44. E.g., Saltzberg v. TM Sterling/Austin Assocs., 45 F.3d 399 (11th Cir. 1995).
45. E.g., Romani v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 929 F.2d 875 (1st Cir. 1991).
46. E.g., Moorhead v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 949 F.2d 243 (8th
Cir. 1991) (involving claim based on misrepresentations or omissions in a financial feasibility
study attached as an exhibit to a bond offering memorandum).
47. E.g., Sinay v. Lamson Sessions Co., 948 F.2d 1037 (6th Cir. 1991) (protecting predic-
tive statements made by management as reported in the Wall Street Journal and New York
Times); In re Hyperion See. Litig., No. 93 Civ. 7179 (MBM), 1995 WL 422480 (S.D.N.Y. July
14, 1995) (protecting oral statements made to brokers during a roadshow where the prospec-
tus containing the cautionary language was distributed at the same time).
48. E.g., Pache v. Wallace, [1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 98,643 at
91,966 (E.D. Pa. March 20, 1995); In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir.
1989). For a discussion of the "fraud on the market" theory, see Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485
U.S. 224,241-47 (1988).
49. In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357,371 (3d Cir. 1993).
50. In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407,1413 n.2 (9th Cir. 1994).
51. I. Meyer Pincus & Assocs., P.C., v. Oppenheimer & Co., 936 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1991).
52. Harden v. Raffensperger Hughes & Co., 65 F.3d 1392 (7th Cir. 1995); In re Valence
Tech. Sec. Litig., No. C 94-1542-SC, 1995 WL 274343, at *14 (N.D. Cal. May 8, 1995)
(holding that company's failure to disclose existing adverse conditions regarding product
renders bespeaks caution doctrine inapplicable).
53. Raab v. General Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 286,290 (4th Cir. 1993).
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about risks that may cause the forecasts, opinions, or projections not to
come to pass.m Furthermore, the majority of courts follow the rule that
boilerplate warnings will not suffice.55
C. Application of the Doctrine
As previously mentioned, the bespeaks caution doctrine is based on
two basic concepts of securities law: materiality and reliance. 6 The
courts have taken two different, but not necessarily separate and dis-
tinct, approaches to the doctrine based on these concepts. Under the
materiality approach, a court can rule as a matter of law that the cau-
tionary language rendered certain forward-looking statements immate-
rial. Under the reliance approach, the court can rule as a matter of law
that as a result of the cautionary language, a reasonable investor would
not have relied on the forward-looking statements. While at least one
court has exclusively applied the reliance approach, 7 most courts have
focused on materiality or applied a combination of the two approaches.
Either approach will yield the same result and there seems to be little, if
any, advantage of one approach over the other.
The leading and most oft-cited case discussing and accepting the vi-
ability of the bespeaks caution doctrine, In re Donald J. Trump Casino
Securities Litigation,58 focuses on a materiality approach, while also ac-
knowledging the possible use of a reliance approach. In Trump, the
plaintiffs, a class of investors who purchased bonds financing the acqui-
sition and completion of the Taj Mahal hotel and casino, sued under
Sections 11 and 12(2) of the Securities Act and Section 10(b) and rule
10b-5 of the Exchange Act, alleging that the prospectus contained ma-
terially misleading statements and omissions. 9 The plaintiffs' primary
argument focused on the Management Discussion and Analysis section
54. E.g., Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 162 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that the lower
court erred in applying the bespeaks caution doctrine "too broadly, essentially [allowing the
language to act as) a per se bar to liability"); Provenz v. Miller, 102 F.3d 1478 (9th Cir. 1996)
(holding that cautionary statements were too general to allow the use of the bespeaks cau-
tion doctrine).
55. In re Worlds of Wonder See. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407, 1414 (9th Cir. 1994); In re Donald
J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 371-72 (3d Cir. 1993).
56. See text accompanying supra note 31.
57. E.g., In re Towers Fin. Corp. Noteholders Litig., No. 93 Civ. 0810 (WK)(AJP) 1996
WL 393579 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 1996) (holding that plaintiffs could not have reasonably relied
on alleged misrepresentations in the Offering Memoranda because language in such Memo-
randa bespoke caution).
58. 7 F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 1993).
59. Id. at 365.
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("MD & A") of the prospectus.' Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that
the defendants had no honest or reasonable belief in the statement:
"The Partnership believes that funds generated from the operation of
the Taj Mahal will be sufficient to cover all of its debt service (interest
and principal)."'"
The prospectus that the investors received contained abundant
warnings and cautionary statements which stressed the following, the
intense industry competition, the casino's unprecedented size, the po-
tential inability to repay interest on the bonds, and the lack of operating
history on which to base the casino's valuation.62 The defendants as-
serted that the cautionary statements alerted investors to obstacles
"which qualif[ied] the statements plaintiffs claim they relied upon,
[thus,] plaintiffs cannot, as a matter of law, contend that they were mis-
led by the alleged misrepresentations and/or omissions."'  The court
agreed.
As an issue of first impression in the Third Circuit, the court em-
braced the viability of the bespeaks caution doctrine. The Trump court
used a context-based, materiality approach," but seemingly used a reli-
ance approach to get there. The court stated its belief that given the
cautionary language in the prospectus, a reasonable investor would not
have been influenced by the statement in the MD & A that the Partner-
ship would be able to cover its debt service.65 Based on this belief, the
court held that the plaintiffs could not prove that the alleged misrepre-
sentation was material.' In essence, the court held that because a rea-
60. Id. The MD & A requires a registrant to discuss, inter alia, any known trends or un-
certainties that would materially affect the registrant's liquidity, capital resources, or opera-
tions. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a) (1996).
61. Trump, 7 F.3d at 365. In addition, the plaintiffs alleged that the omission of the
following allegedly material information was misleading: 1) the Taj Mahal required an aver-
age "casino win" of approximately $1.3 million per day on a continuing basis in order to
service its debtload; 2) Donald Trump had personally guaranteed hundreds of millions of
dollars in bank loans for other properties; and 3) the Taj Mahal had an "unprecedented"
debt to equity ratio.
Id. at 366-67.
62. Id at 365.
63. Idt at 367.
64. The court used the definition of materiality set forth by the Supreme Court in TSC
Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976), that an omission is material if there is a
substantial likelihood that the disclosure "would have been viewed by the reasonable inves-
tor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made available." TSC Indus.,
at 449. Although the TSC court specified that this definition applied only to omissions, the
Trump court applied it both the misstatements and omissions.
65. Trump, 7 F.3d at 369.
66. Id, The court also emphasized that the forward-looking statements must be read in
1997]
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sonable investor would not have relied on forward-looking statements
as a matter of law (reliance approach), the statements were immaterial
as a matter of law (materiality approach).
In adopting the bespeaks caution doctrine, the court stated that the
doctrine may be applied to allegations of both misstatements and omis-
sions of forward-looking information.67 The court enumerated its stan-
dard for the bespeaks caution doctrine as follows:
[W]hen an offering document's forecasts, opinions or projections
are accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements, the for-
ward-looking statements will not form the basis for a securities
fraud claim if those statements did not affect the "total mix" of
information the document provided investors. In other words,
cautionary language, if sufficient, renders the alleged omissions
or misrepresentations immaterial as a matter of law."
What the court meant by "sufficient" is that cautionary language must
contain substantive information that specifically applies to the chal-
lenged forward-looking statement, and that a boilerplate warning or
disclaimer will not suffice."9
The Trump court, by emphasizing specificity of cautionary language
and the importance of a context-based analysis, was careful not to set
forth too broad a standard, such as the Fourth Circuit's per se standard,
in which cautionary statements will always negate materiality. Not al
of the circuits have adopted the exact Trump formulation of the doc-
trine, although those courts using the doctrine after Trump have cited
its formulation with approval.70
D. Problems with the Doctrine
As a result of a lack of uniform application in the circuits and the
fact that one circuit has yet to adopt any version of the doctrine, an is-
suer's reliance on the protection of the bespeaks caution doctrine when
drafting offering documents with forward-looking information is quite
risky. This is especially true if the issuer is amenable to personal juris-
context and found that the allegedly misleading statement was among a myriad of warnings
and thus, "the context clearly and precisely relayed to the bondholders the substantial uncer-
tainties inherent in the completion and operation of the Taj Mahal." Id. at 371.
67. Id
68. Id.
69. Id. at 371-72.
70. E.g., Grossman v. Novell, 120 F.3d 1112, 1120 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Morris, 80 F.3d 1151, 1167 (7th Cir. 1996); In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407,
1414 (9th Cir. 1994); Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 167-68 (5th Cir. 1994).
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diction in more than one circuit due to contacts in various states.
From an investor's point of view, the most dangerous loophole left
by the doctrine is that if cautionary statements considered in context
can render misrepresentations and omissions immaterial as a matter of
law, the state of mind of the maker of the statement may never be ques-
tioned . In other words, under the Trump formulation of the doctrine,
issuers, underwriters, accountants, and other parties involved in the dis-
semination of information about a registrant may implicitly be allowed
to make a forward-looking statement which he or she may not neces-
sarily believe is an accurate projection, as long as meaningful specific
cautionary language accompanies such statement.7
Meanwhile, the Fifth Circuit has made clear that "the inclusion of
general cautionary language regarding a prediction [will] not excuse the
alleged failure to reveal known material, adverse facts." 73 This essen-
tially means that if one intentionally makes an omission of information
which might adversely affect the prediction, the doctrine will not apply.
While this assertion seemingly alleviates the loophole in Trump, it ad-
dresses only omissions, not statements in which the maker did not have
a reasonable belief. In such cases, investors may be forced to rely on
the seldom-used Rule 175 and be faced with the difficult burden of
proving that "such statement was made or reaffirmed without a reason-
able basis or was disclosed other than in good faith."74
Other uncertainties of the doctrine include: whether the doctrine
can rightfully be applied to omissions-as the Trump court asserted but
other courts have rejected;75 whether the doctrine can be used to protect
oral statements-as few courts have addressed the issue; and to whom
and to what types of documents the doctrine applies-as no court has
articulated a bright-line rule. As a result of such uncertainties, these is-
sues are decided on a case-by-case basis. Because the interpretation is
left up to the judiciary, which can refine or broaden the doctrine as it so
desires, an issuer can never be absolutely certain that it will be pro-
tected from liability.
71. See Langevoort, supra note 4, at 400 (asserting that, under Trump, "even deliberates
misrepresentation by the promoters apparently will be insulated from liability").
72. The Trump court never reached the question of whether the defendants possessed a
genuine or reasonable belief in the statements made in the MD & A, which was the plaintiffs'
primary allegation, because it decided that the cautionary statements rendered the projec-
tions immaterial. See 7 F.3d at 357.
73. Rubinstein, 20 F.3d, at 171.
74. 17 CF.R. § 230.175(a).




It is clear that as the doctrine has developed from a phrase in a foot-
note to justify the dismissal of a claim, the standard has become nar-
rower, requiring greater specificity in the cautionary language. What is
yet to be seen is whether the SEC will recognize that this doctrine is
partially usurped by the new Congressionally-created safe harbor for
forward-looking statements, discussed below, and take action to codify
the doctrine in order to provide one uniform standard which will put is-
suers, investors, and courts on notice as to which forward-looking
statements may be actionable.
III. THE CONGRESSIONALLY-CREATED SAFE HARBOR FOR
FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS
A. The Development of the Safe Harbor
As part of its "Contract with America," the newly-empowered Re-
publican Party was determined to end frivolous private securities litiga-
tion. 6 While Congress eventually succeeded in passing the Reform Act,
it was not without much debate. Of the many issues considered under
the Reform Act, the safe harbor for forward-looking statements gener-
ated the greatest controversy.' Like the courts, Congress recognized
that the safe harbor promulgated by SEC Rule 175, "has not provided
companies meaningful protection from litigation"78 and thus acknowl-
edged the need for a new safe harbor with better protection.
When Senators Pete Domenici and Chris Dodd proposed the Re-
form Act, the SEC was in the process of considering the adoption of a
safe harbor for forward-looking statements.7 ' As introduced, the Re-
form Act would have allowed the SEC to continue its rulemaking ef-
forts, as well as make recommendations to Congress for legislative assis-
tance.' The project was eventually removed from the SEC's hands, but
76. See generally S. REP. No. 104-98 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679; H.R.
CONF. REP. NO. 104-369 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730. Although the debate
over the legislation produced volumes of documentation, the agreed upon legislative history
for the Reform Act is the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference,
which comprises only seventeen pages. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730.
77. Martha L. Cochran & Catherine Collins McCoy, The Safe Harbor for Forward-
Looking Statements, 10 INSIGHTS 14, 14 (1996).
78. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369, at 49 n.29, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 748
n. 29.
79. See Safe Harbor Release, [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
85,436, at 85,778.
80. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 41, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679,719-20.
[Vol. 81:133
THE BESPEAKS CAUTION DOCTRINE
the SEC continued to make considerable contributions and provide in-
put that was not always heeded. Before the Act reached its final form,
the chairman of the SEC, Arthur Levitt, expressed concern that the safe
harbor would provide immunity from liability for fraudulent state-
ments.8' Several Senators agreed with him even after revisions took
place.s2 While the SEC may not have gotten exactly what it wanted,' its
efforts were far from fruitless. The SEC's role in the legislation pro-
duced many exclusions from the safe harbor that may prove to be con-
troversial for parties that the SEC felt were problematic, such as blank
check and penny stock issuers."
From beginning to end, the goal of the legislative safe harbor re-
mained the same: to encourage issuers to disclose forward-looking in-
formation by insulating them from liability if such information did not
come true." President Clinton supported the goals of the Reform Act
to end frivolous lawsuits and to ensure that investors receive the best
possible information by reducing the litigation risk for forward-looking
statements; however, he vetoed the measure on December 19, 1995.6
Despite the President's support for the safe harbor for forward-looking
statements, he objected to the language in the Conference Committee
Report relating to the safe harbor, stating that it "attempts to weaken
the cautionary language that the bill itself requires" and that "investors
[may] find their legitimate claims unfairly dismissed."' The House of
Representatives voted to override the veto on December 20, 1995 by
81. Levitt stated, "I cannot embrace proposals which allow willful fraud to receive the
benefit of safe harbor protection." Letter of May 25, 1995, to Senator D'Amato relating to
S.240 as presented to the Senate, included as Exhibit 1 to Statement of Senator Sarbanes, 41
CONG. REC. S8905 (daily ed. June 22, 1995); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Or, Why the Fat Lady Has Not Yet Sung, 51 Bus.
LAw. 975, 989 (1996). ("Probably the most striking feature of the Reform Act's safe harbor
is the immunity it seems to give a bald, knowing lie that is surrounded by 'meaningful cau-
tionary sentiments."').
82. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 104-98, at 40-44, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 718-23
(Additional Views of Senators Sarbanes, Bryan, and Boxer).
83. Chairman Levitt implied in a speech that he did not give full approval to the legisla-
tion. He mentioned the President's veto message and stated that "[t]he points raised by the
President were an attempt to make the bill a bit better. The Congress decided to go ahead
with the legislation as it was. So be it." Arthur Levitt Final Thoughts on Litigation Reform
(Jan. 24, 1996) (visited November 20, 1997) <http'J/www.sec.gov/newslspeeches/spch070.txt>.
84. Id.
85. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 16, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679,695.
86. 141 CONG. REC. H15214-15 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995).
87. Id, see also Michael K. Frisby & Jeffrey Taylor, Clinton Vetoes Bill Limiting Securi-
ties Suits, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 1995, at A3.
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over a three to one majority' and the Senate, after two days of debate,
did the same on December 22, 1995, by voting over two to one to over-
ride the veto. 9
B. The Final Product
The final result, after much deliberation, was an amendment adding
Section 27A to the Securities Acte and an amendment adding Section
21E to the Exchange Act.91 Each of these sections is the same except
that they appear in two separate statutory bodies of law.
In its final form, the safe harbor, like the bespeaks caution doctrine,
provides protection from liability if the relevant factors and risks un-
derlying the projection are adequately disclosed?9 Alternatively, pro-
tection is provided if the plaintiff cannot prove that the person making
the projection had actual knowledge that it contained an untrue state-
ment or omission of a material fact.93 The safe harbor protects only
forward-looking statements, the definition of which was borrowed in
large part from Rule 175.94 But unlike Rule 175, this safe harbor is not
88. See 141 CONG. REC. H15223-24 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995). see also Jeffrey Taylor,
House Overrides Veto of Bill Curbing Securities Suits, but Senate Fight Looms, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 21, 1995, at A3.
89. See 141 CONG. REC. S19180 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1995). see also Jeffrey Taylor, Con-
gress Sends Business a Christmas Gift; Veto is Overridden on Bill Curbing Securities Lawsuits,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 26, 1995, at A2.
90. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2 (1996).
91. Id § 78u-5.
92. See text accompanying infra notes 102-07.
93. See text accompanying infra note 109.
94. Rule 175 defines forward-looking statements as:
(1) A statement containing a projection of revenues, income (loss), earnings (loss)
per share, capital expenditures, dividends, capital structure or other financial items;
(2) A statement of management's plans and objectives for future operations;
(3) A statement of future economic performance contained in management's dis-
cussion and analysis of financial condition and results of operations included pursu-
ant to Item 303 of Regulation S-K ... or Item 9 of Form 20-F; or
(4) Disclosed statement of the assumptions underlying or relating to any of the
statements described in paragraphs (C)(1), (2), or (3) of this section.
17 C.F.R. § 230.175(c) (1996). The safe harbor defines "forward-looking statement" as:
(A) a statement containing a projection of revenues, income (including income
loss), earnings (including earnings loss) per share, capital expenditures, dividends,
capital structure, or other financial items;
(B) a statement of the plans and objectives of management for future operations,
including plans or objectives relating to the products or services of the issuer;
(C) a statement of future economic performance, including any such statement con-
tained in a discussion and analysis of financial condition by the management or in
the results of operations included pursuant to the rules and regulations of the
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limited to documents filed with the SEC; it extends to any statement
within its scope. Finally, the safe harbor's protection is not available in
SEC enforcement actions, it is only available in private actions arising
under the Securities or Exchange Acts based on misstatements or omis-
sions of material facts.95
Congress carefully carved out the scope of the safe harbor with sev-
eral exclusions at the request of the SEC.96 Specifically, the safe harbor
covers forward-looking statements made by issuers subject to the re-
porting requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act,
anyone acting on behalf of such issuer, outside reviewers of the state-
ments, and underwriters.' Protection is not provided to issuers who
have been convicted of certain securities violations" or who have been
the subject of a judicial or administrative decree involving the antifraud
provisions of the securities laws in the preceding three years." The safe
harbor also excludes statements made in a financial statement prepared
in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, made by
an investment company, made in a disclosure of beneficial ownership,
and made in connection with a tender offer, an initial public offering,
partnership, limited liability company, or direct participation invest-
ment program.1"
The centerpiece of the safe harbor is composed of two alternative
prongs, the bespeaks caution prong, and the actual knowledge prong.
Under the bespeaks caution prong:
a person [to whom this title applies] shall not be liable with re-
spect to any forward-looking statement, whether written or oral,
if and to the extent that-
(A) The forward-looking statement is-
Commission;
(D) any statement of the assumptions underlying or relating to any statement de-
scribed in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C);
(E) any report issued by an outside reviewer retained by an issuer, to the extent
that the report assesses a forward-looking statement made by the issuer; or
(F) a statement containing a projection or estimate of such other items as may be
specified by rule or regulation of the Commission.
15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(i)(1), 78u-5(i)(1) (1996).
95. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(c)(1), 78u-5(c)(1) (1996).
96. See accompanying text supra note 84..
97. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(a), 78u-5(a) (1996).
98. To be excluded, the conviction must have been in the past three years and been for
one of the acts enumerated in Section 15(b)(4)(B)(i)-(iv). Id. §§ 77z-2(b)(1)(A), 78u-
5(b)(1)(A).
99. Id. §§ 77z-2(b)(1)(A), 78u-5(b)(1)(A).
100. Id. §§ 77z-2(b)(2), 78u-5(b)(2).
1997]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:133
(i) identified as a forward-looking statement, and is accom-
panied by meaningful cautionary statements identifying im-
portant factors that could cause actual results to differ mate-
rially from those in the forward-looking statement; or
(ii) immaterial.'
Like the bespeaks caution doctrine, boilerplate warnings will not suffice
to satisfy the requirement of cautionary language."° Instead, the cau-
tionary statements must substantively relay information about particu-
lar factors relevant to the projection that could cause results materially
different than those projected in the forward-looking statement., Fur-
thermore, the "[f]ailure to include the particular factor that ultimately
causes the forward-looking statement not to come true will not mean [in
and of itself] that the statement is not protected by the safe harbor."' 4
The Conference Committee stated that under the bespeaks caution
prong, courts are not to examine the state of mind of the person who
made the forward-looking statement,105 which, like the Trump formula-
tion of the bespeaks caution doctrine, may create a loophole for those
who intentionally make a misleading statement but include the appro-
priate cautionary language. In addition, the Conference Committee
provided little guidance for the meaning of ambiguous terms in this
provision such as "meaningful," "accompanied by," and "important. '
101. Id. §§ 77z-2(c)(1)(A), 78u-5(c)(1)(A). Interestingly, Congress claimed it relied on
the principles of the bespeaks caution doctrine in formulating this first prong, but an analyti-
cal reading of the first prong as a whole leads one to believe that the function and end result
of the doctrine was not fully understood. The first subdivision clearly reflects the underlying
principle of the doctrine, which, in the courts, may render a forward-looking statement im-
material as a matter of law. See In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357 (3d. Cir.
1993). It seems redundant that a second, disjunctive subdivision is needed when immaterial-
ity is the result of satisfaction of the first subdivision. Moreover, materiality is a key concept
in securities law; an investor may not even state a cause of action under the catch-all anti-
fraud provision unless the alleged misstatement or omission is material. See 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-5(b) (1996); see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988); TSC Indus., Inc. v.
Northway, Inc. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
102. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 43 (1995) reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,
743.
103. Id. at 43-44, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,743-44.
104. Id. at 44, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,743.
105. Id. The stated purpose for not examining the state of mind of the person who
made the forward-looking statement was to not give plaintiffs' lawyers the opportunity to
conduct extensive discovery to determine what was and was not known at the time the
statement was made. Id.
106. Six Senators urged the Conference Committee to clarify the terms of the safe har-
bor to provide a bright-line rule that is unmistakable to both potential plaintiffs and defen-
dants. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 33-35, (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 711-13
(Additional Views of Senators Gramm, Mack, Faricloth, Bennett, Grams, and Frist). For a
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The first subdivision of the bespeaks caution prong is the one most
widely to be relied upon by issuers. This is because little was accom-
plished by the second subdivision of this prong which restates an estab-
lished principal of securities law-that immaterial statements are inac-
tionable.
Under the actual knowledge prong, there is no liability if:
the plaintiff fails to prove that the forward-looking statement-
(i) if made by a natural person, was made with actual knowledge
by that person that the statement was false or misleading; or
(ii) if made by a business entity; was-
(I) made by or with the approval of an executive officer of
that entity, and
(II) made or approved by such officer with actual knowledge
by that officer that the statement was false or misleading.107
A literal reading of the actual knowledge prong appears to leave a
loophole for anyone bent on making a fraudulent misstatement or omis-
sion. ' s Such statement could be made under the guise of the business
entity by anyone who is not an executive officer of the entity and, even
with the approval of an executive officer, without informing such officer
that the statement is false or misleading." 9 Because lawyers draft or
oversee the majority of disseminated information, this task would seem
quite easy.
The safe harbor also protects oral statements" if the statements are
identified as forward-looking and include a cautionary statement that
complies with the requirements enumerated in the bespeaks caution
prong."' Alternatively, oral forward-looking statements will be pro-
tected if they expressly state that actual results may materially differ
discussion of the meaning of these terms (or lack thereof), see infra part V-D.
107. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(c)(1)(B), 78u-5(c)(1)(B) (1996). Read in conjunction with the
Reform Act's heightened pleading standard, requiring the plaintiff "state with particularity
facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of
mind," this prong may be a difficult burden for a plaintiff to meet. See id, § 78u-4(b)(2).
108. The Statement of Managers states that "only the cautionary statement accompa-
nying the forward-looking statement [is to be examined by the courts]. Courts should not
examine the state of mind of the person making the statement." 141 CONG. REC. H13703
(daily ed. Nov. 28, 1995).
109. See Schneider & Dubow, supra note 24, at 1088-89.
110. This portion of the safe harbor was developed in recognition that companies fre-
quently disseminate forward-looking information to analysts and investors during phone calls
and meetings. See Stephen C. Waterbury, Bespeaks Caution Doctrine, Forward Looking
Statements and Due Diligence: Case Law Remains Relevant, MIDWEST SEC. L. INST. (Detroit
Metro. Bar Assoc. ), Nov. 7, 1996, at 7.
111. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(c)(1), 78u-5(c)(1) (1996).
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from those projected and if they clearly identify a "readily available
written document, or portion thereof"112 that contains detailed caution-
ary statements that comport with the bespeaks caution prong.13  This
portion of the safe harbor is available only to the officers, directors, and
employees of the issuer or the same of those acting on the issuer's be-
half."
4
Additional provisions in the safe harbor provide that there is no
duty to update any forward-looking statement,"5 and that in deciding a
motion to dismiss, a court must consider any statements cited in the
plaintiff's complaint as well as any cautionary statements accompanying
the forward-looking statement at issue cited by the defendant." 6 In ad-
dition, the safe harbor requires courts to stay discovery proceedings for
matters unrelated to the safe harbor while a defendant's motion for
summary judgment is pending, provided that the motion is based on a
claim of protection under the safe harbor."' Finally, and of significant
importance, is the encouragement the Conference Committee voiced to
the SEC to use its rulemaking power to expand the coverage of the safe
harbor, provide additional exemptions, and consider the adoption of
additional safe harbors to cover currently excluded statements. "8
C. The Issuers' Reaction
As a result of the enactment of the safe harbor, public companies
have had to reevaluate their disclosure policies and procedures for for-
ward-looking statements. It is overwhelmingly apparent that issuers are
pleased with the legislation because a significant amount of companies
112. "Readily available," for purposes of this provision, means "[a]ny document filed
with the [SEC] or generally disseminated." Id §§ 77z-2(c)(3), 78u-5(c)(3). "Generally dis-
seminated" documents are not defined, but would likely include annual reports and other
widely distributed materials, such as press releases.
113. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(c)(2)(A), 78u-5(c)(2)(A) (1996).
114. Id §§ 77z-2(c)(2), 78u-5(c)(2).
115. Id. §§ 77z-2(d), 78u-5(d). Under current case law, this does not, however, alleviate
any existing duty to update. See Schneider & Dubow, supra note 24, at 1077 n. 36.
116. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(e), 78u-5(e) (1996). The cautionary statements the defendant
cites must not be subject to material dispute. Id. The material dispute limitation seems to be
somewhat ambiguous insofar as it is not clear what about the cautionary statements must not
be subject to dispute-the existence of it, its cautionary nature, or whether it "accompanied"
the forward-looking statement. The legislative history provides little guidance on this issue;
therefore, its meaning will likely be left to the interpretation of the courts.
117. Id. §§ 77z-2(f), 78u-5(f).
118. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 46 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,
745; see also S. REP. No. 104-98, at 18 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 697. For a
discussion of suggested refinements which the SEC could consider, see infra Part V-C.
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have taken advantage of the first prong in their proxy statements and
annual, quarterly, and special reports. An explicit example of an is-
suer's attempt to comport with the new safe harbor is Motorola's 1996
proxy statement n9 The MD & A portion includes under the heading
"Other Matters" a section entitled "Cautionary Statement for Purposes
of the 'Safe Harbor' provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Re-
form Act of 1995.""' This section enumerates the headings throughout
the report that contain forward-looking statements and alerts the reader
to the uncertainties in such statements.12 ' The section then exhaustively
describes in detail the "important" factors which could cause Mo-
torola's actual results to "differ materially from those expressed in any
forward-looking statements made by, or on behalf of, Motorola."12
Without precedent to set forth a standard of comparison, Motorola's
MD & A appears to satisfy the bespeaks caution prong of the safe har-
bor because it specifically identifies statements that are forward-
looking, and with reference to the statements, identifies important fac-
tors which could cause materially different results than those pro-
jected." Motorola's cautionary language clearly is not boilerplate. For
those same reasons, the MD & A also appears to satisfy any formula-
tion of the bespeaks caution doctrine. Then why should the courts con-
tinue to use the bespeaks caution doctrine if the safe harbor provides an
efficient, statutory basis for reaching the same result? The doctrine and
the safe harbor will not always provide identical protection; however,
any disparity could be resolved if the SEC heeds the Conference Com-
mittee's encouragement to use its rulemaking power to expand or limit
the safe harbor. First, though, the disparities between the doctrine and
the statutes must be fleshed out.
IV. WHAT'S THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE JUDICIAL DOCTRINE
AND THE LEGISLATIVE SAFE HARBOR?
The Conference Committee acknowledged that the development of
the safe harbor was based on aspects of the judicially-created bespeaks
119. Motorola Inc., DEF 14A (May 7, 1996), available in WESTLAW, EDGAR data-
base at Filing 96536232.
120. Id. at 33.
121. Id. at 33-34.
122. Id. at 33. Such factors include a moderating growth rate in the cellular subscriber
bases, underutilization of Motorola's plants and factories, growth in Motorola's selling, gen-
eral, and administrative expenses, difficulties in obtaining raw materials, and risks related to
the success of one of Motorola's new projects. Id. at 33-34.
123. See text accompanying supra note 101.
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caution doctrine" while also acknowledging that the safe harbor was
not meant to replace the doctrine.'2' As a result, issuers and investors
are subject to the courts' ad hoc interpretation of two separate, yet very
similar, standards. At least one court has already erred in stating that
the safe harbor is a codification of the bespeaks caution doctrine.'2 Un-
til action is taken to merge the two, it is important to understand the
similarities and differences between the protections provided by the ju-
dicial doctrine and the legislative safe harbor.
The judicial doctrine and the legislative safe harbor share the same
underlying purpose: to provide protection to issuers that disclose for-
ward-looking information with protection from frivolous lawsuits.'
17
The bespeaks caution doctrine emphasizes that cautionary language
must be "substantive and tailored to the specific future projections, es-
timates or opinions" at issue," and the safe harbor requires the cau-
tionary language to be "meaningful" and contain specific "important"
factors that may change the outcome of the projection.'29 Thus, under
both the doctrine and the safe harbor, it is clear that in order to be pro-
tected from liability for forward-looking statements that turn out not to
come true, the cautionary language surrounding the statement must be
issuer-specific and carefully crafted. They also share a seemingly broad
scope insofar as the statements they may reach, including publicly-made
statements and statements released to the media.'O
There are also some important differences between the Congres-
sionally-created safe harbor and the judicially-created doctrine. The
legislative history of the safe harbor states that the failure to include the
specific factor that ultimately causes the forward-looking statement not
124. See S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 17 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 696, H.R.
CONF. REP. No 104-369, at 43 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,742.
125. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369, at 46, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 745..
126. Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1213 n.23 (1st Cir. 1996) ("The doc-
trine has been codified in the Securities Litigation Reform Act.").
127. See supra notes 30,76 and accompanying text.
128. In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 371-72 (3d. Cir. 1993). Con-
gress relied on the Trump formulation of the doctrine when drafting the safe harbor. See
SEN. REP. No. 104-98, at 17 nn.53-54, (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 696 nn.53-
54.
129. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(c)(1)(A)(i), 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(i) (1996).
130. The distinguishing factor between publicly-made statements protected under the
doctrine and those protected under the portion of the safe harbor relating to oral forward-
looking statements is that under the safe harbor, the listener must also be referred to a
"readily available" document that likewise, or in more detail, enumerates the factors possibly
affecting the realization of the forward-looking statement. Id. §§ 77z-2(c)(2), 78u-5(c)(2).
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to materialize will not remove the safe harbor's protection.131 This es-
sentially means that the safe harbor will protect omissions as long as
proper cautionary language was present. At first blush, it seems that
courts allowing omissions to fall under the bespeaks caution doctrine
would agree with this provision. However, those courts using a materi-
ality approach to determine whether an omission should be afforded
protection under the bespeaks caution doctrine likely would find that
the failure to include the specific factor which ultimately causes the
forward looking statement not to materialize is not protected. This is
because the standard set forth by the Supreme Court for materiality of
omissions is whether there is a "substantial likelihood that the disclo-
sure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable in-
vestor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made
available.' 3 2 The fact that the facts or events constituting the omission
caused the forward-looking statement to differ from its projection
would weigh strongly in favor of finding that such omission was mate-
rial. Thus, while the bespeaks caution doctrine may not protect the
omission of the factor that ultimately causes the projection not to come
true, the safe harbor may afford protection.
The most glaring difference between the safe harbor and the be-
speaks caution doctrine is the safe harbor's exclusions. The Confer-
ence Committee did not include in the legislative history the reasons
why initial public offerings, partnership offerings, tender offers, going
private transactions, and others are not given the benefit of the safe
harbor. It seems odd that Congress chose to embrace the essence of the
bespeaks caution doctrine, yet excluded statements made in connection
with particular transactions that are protected in some of the core be-
speaks caution cases.'33
An analysis of the judicial doctrine versus the legislative safe harbor
reveals that the principal of the bespeaks caution doctrine was codified
in the safe harbor, but that the bright-line scope of the legislative safe
harbor clearly distinguishes the two. What they do share is a world of
uncertainty that will have to be looked through by the courts unless the
SEC takes initiative to merge the judicial and legislative creations into a
single uniform standard.
131. See text accompanying supra note 104..
132. Basic Inc. v Levinson 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438,449 (1976)).
133. See, e.g., In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 814 F. Supp. 850 (N.D. Cal. 1993),
affd, 35 F.3d 1407 (9th Cir. 1994) (initial public offering); Romani v. Shearson Lehman Hut-
ton, 929 F.2d 875 (1st Cir. 1991) (limited partnership).
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V. THE SEC'S CALL To ACTION To REFINE THE SAFE HARBOR
A. The Need for Change
What seems most peculiar about the legislative safe harbor in the
Reform Act is that the Conference Committee implicitly accepted the
viability of the bespeaks caution doctrine"3 and used it as a basis in its
drafting of the legislation, but then left the doctrine intact and encour-
aged the courts to further its development. What prevented Congress,
in its painstaking process of producing the final legislation, from simply
codifying the doctrine and providing one uniform body of law to which
the courts, issuers, and investors could turn and clearly be put on notice
of what kinds of statements would be actionable? Moreover, why did
Congress, in its valiant effort to diminish frivolous litigation, set forth
an ambiguous standard which invites litigation to determine its mean-
ing?
B. Why the SEC?
While the recent efforts of the courts in developing the bespeaks
caution doctrine have provided some protection for issuers, the doctrine
is subject to judicial decision making and its future is at the mercy of the
lifetime-tenured judges in the federal courts. These judges possess a
wealth of knowledge on many subjects, but likely are not all experts in
the area of securities regulation. There lies an inherent risk for issuers
to rely on judge-made law to protect them from liability. This is due to
the possibility that one judge might decide to narrow or even dispose of
the bespeaks caution doctrine for policy reasons or on the basis of a
persuasive argument on the day that particular issuer is in court.3 '
Similarly, while it cannot be disputed that the Reform Act promul-
gated by Congress has been warmly welcomed and already put into use
by issuers previously plagued by the fear of being sued on the basis of
forward-looking information that does not materialize,'36 Congress is
134. When it based the premise of the safe harbor on the bespeaks caution doctrine and
explicitly encouraged the courts to develop the doctrine, Congress voiced approval for its
underlying principal and utility in securities litigation. See supra text accompanying notes 20-
21.
135. The Conference Committee agreed that the judiciary is not the best entity to inter-
pret and develop securities law. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683. The Committee stated that judges have been "free to develop con-
flicting legal standards, thereby creating substantial uncertainties and opportunities for
abuses of investors, issuers, professional firms and others."
136. See, e.g., supra part III-c. See generally John P. Redd, Safe Harbor Protections:
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not the best entity to refine the legislation to maximize its benefit to is-
suers and investors. Congress is subject to political powers in its deci-
sion making process such as the views of interest groups and the views
of its constituents. In addition, to produce a consensus, Congress can be
forced, as it was in the passage of the Reform Act, to compromise pro-
visions that might have provided additional benefits."'
Clearly the entity in the best position to clarify the legislation is the
SEC. As the administrative agency created to regulate the securities
industry, the SEC certainly possesses the knowledge and expertise to
promulgate rules and regulations regarding forward-looking statements.
Chairman Levitt has expressed the view that this approach is not only
appropriate, but more efficient than legislation.'3 The SEC should heed
the Conference Committee's suggestion to build upon the existing safe
harbor 39 and provide clear and comprehensive standards protecting is-
suers from vexatious litigation. Moreover, should the SEC, at a mini-
mum, provide interpretive releases of the ambiguous terms of the safe
harbor, the courts would be required to defer to those interpretations
under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 4" thereby eliminating danger of a judicial misinterpretation.
C. A Task Left Unfinished
Before Senators Domenici and Dodd introduced the Reform Act,
the SEC contemplated promulgating a safe harbor for forward-looking
statements. 4' In response to notice of the SEC's intent, Professor John
C. Coffee, Jr. proposed Rule 10b-22, a codification of a variant of the
Improving the Effectiveness of Written Cautionary Statements in Light of New Law, BNA
CORP. COUNSEL WEEKLY Sept. 11, 1996, at 12.
137. Senator Chris Dodd acknowledged that the need to produce a consensus in order
to get Congress to pass the Reform Act resulted in the exclusion of certain provisions which
he wished would have been included. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 51, reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 679,729 (additional Views of Senator Dodd).
138. In testimony before the Securities Subcommittee, Chairman Levitt stated that
"[b]ased on the Commission's experience with this issue to date, we believe that there is con-
siderable value in proceeding with rulemaking, which can more efficiently be administered,
interpreted and if needed, modified, than can legislation." Securities Litigation Reform:
Hearings on S.240 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 104th Cong., (1995) (statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, Se-
curities and Exchange Commission).
139. See text accompanying supra note 118.
140. 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see also Coffee, supra note 81, at 996.




bespeaks caution doctrine.'42 Professor Coffee's proposal provided pro-
tection to forward-looking statements made in a document filed with
the SEC or made in connection with an annual report. 43 It protected
statements regarding liquidity, capital resources, and operations results
insofar as they described predictive trends, demands, commitments, or
other uncertainties' 44 Such a statement would be protected only if it
contained or was closely accompanied by "clear and specific cautionary
language that explains in detail sufficient to inform a reasonable person
of the level of risk associated with, or inherent in, the statement and
that identifies the specific basis for such statement and for such level of
risk."' 4 The proposal also sought to include, as the safe harbor does, is-
suers subject to the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Ex-
change Act, but sought to exclude only "penny stock" issuers and in-
vestment companies registered under the Investment Company Act of
1940.16
By the time the SEC began to seriously consider the number of pro-
posals it had received, such as Professor Coffee's, Congress had already
taken action to develop the Reform Act. This does not mean, however,
that the SEC cannot look back to what it started several years ago to
further develop Congress' safe harbor.
D. What the SEC Should Do Now to Provide a Uniform Standard
Although the legislation has its faults, Congress has provided a
workable foundation on which the SEC can build by filling in the gap
between the safe harbor and the bespeaks caution doctrine and by pro-
viding definitions for ambiguous language. The SEC has already used
its rulemaking power to adopt rules relating to the safe harbor in the
context of derivative financial and commodity instruments and should
continue down that path to further refine the safe harbor.'"
142. Id. at 85,795-96. Additional alternatives included a "Seasoned Issuer" Proposal, a
Business-Judgment Rule Proposal, a "Heightened Definition" Proposal, a "Fraudulent In-
tent" Proposal, a "Disimplication" Theory, a Reasonable Basis in Fact Proposal, and an
"Opt-In" Proposal. Id. at 85,788-90.
143. Id. at 85, 795.
144. Id. at 85, 795-96.
145. Id.
146. Id at 85,795-96.
147. The SEC proposed amendments on April 6, 1996, and adopted them on January
31, 1997. These amendments expand the safe harbor to apply to quantitative market risk in-
formation for derivative and other financial instruments, as well as information about market
risk regarding future reporting periods. This information will appear in Items 305(a) and
305(b)(3) of Regulation S-K and Item 9A(a) of Form 20-F. Disclosure of Accounting Poli-
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The primary areas that SEC needs to address are safe harbor's ex-
clusions and the legislation's ambiguous language. Concerning the ex-
clusions, the SEC should first recognize the Conference Committee's
suggestion to give special considerations in their rulemaking efforts to
established and reputable entities excluded from the safe harbor's pro-
tections.1" This suggestion, however, seems just as ambiguous as Con-
gress' other efforts insofar as what "established and reputable" mean.
Similarly, the SEC should look to what the Advisory Committee on
Corporate Disclosure suggested almost twenty years ago-to include all
registrants,'49 but leave intact the exception for issuers convicted of vio-
lating the securities laws and issuers subject to a judicial or administra-
tive decree related to securities fraud in the past three years. It seems
that if Congress was willing to give the safe harbor such a broad scope
and apply it to all communications by an issuer, whether or not that
communication is filed with the SEC, its scope should be just as broad
and apply to all registrants, with minimal exceptions. The SEC should
look to Professor Coffee's suggestion to keep intact the exclusion of
penny stock issuers, as well as other issuer transactions that are inher-
ently risky, including blank check offerings and rollup transactions.
To codify the bespeaks caution doctrine, initial public offerings,
partnership offerings, and registrants under the Investment Company
Act of 1940 should not be excluded.'o As long as Congress has encour-
aged the courts to further develop the doctrine covering these offerings
and parties, it is rational for the SEC to simply expand the scope of the
safe harbor to reach the outer limits of the bespeaks caution doctrine to
provide a uniform, rather than alternative, body of law.
Concerning the ambiguous language in the safe harbor, particularly
the terms "accompanied by," "meaningful," and "important," the SEC
should consider the following interpretive rules. These rules would
bring the safe harbor into parity with, and essentially usurp, the be-
speaks caution doctrine because they codify the uses of the doctrine
while also providing specific, bright-line rules.
cies for Derivative Financial Instruments and Derivative Commodity Instruments and Dis-
closure of Quantitative and Qualitative Information About Market Risk Inherent in Deriva-
tive Financial Instruments, Other Financial Instruments and Derivative Commodity Instru-
ments, Securities Act Release No. 7386, Exchange Act Release No. 38223 (Jan. 31, 1997),
available in WESTLAW at 1997 WL 39324.
148. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, at 46 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,
745.
149. See supra note 26.




To receive protection under the safe harbor, a forward-looking
statement must be accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements
which identify important factors that could cause actual results to differ
materially from those in the forward-looking statement. In a written
document, "accompanied by" means within the same section or under
the same heading of the document. It is also acceptable, within the sec-
tion or under the heading of the document containing the forward-
looking statements, to explicitly refer the reader to other sections of the
same document that contain cautionary language.' It is not acceptable
for a written document to incorporate by reference cautionary state-
ments contained in a separate document, 2 regardless of whether that
separate document is filed with the SEC.
The meaning of "accompanied by" for purposes of oral forward-
looking statements is enumerated in the statutory safe harbor, but for
clarification, reference to generally disseminated documents may in-
clude press releases.
2. "Meaningful" Cautionary Statements
The term "meaningful" is included to draw a distinction between
boilerplate and substantive disclosure.' To be considered
"meaningful," cautionary statements must be industry and issuer-
specific and explain to the reader or listener in detail why the forward-
looking information does not affect the "total mix" of information pro-
vided to investors.' In addition, the cautionary language should urge
the reader or listener to consider the forward-looking information in
context with the meaningful warnings.
3. "Important" Factors
Included with forward-looking information must be important fac-
151. This suggestion is based on the "contains or is closely accompanied by" language in
Professor Coffee's proposal. See Safe Harbor Release, [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,436, at 85,795.
152. This addition prevents confusion on the part of potential investors who may not be
familiar with the other types of documents available. By requiring that the forward-looking
statements be "accompanied by" cautionary language in the same document, there is no risk
that a reader would not have available all the factors which should or should not play into his
or her investment decision.
153. See Coffee, supra note 81, at 987.
154. This language is included to codify the Trump formulation of the bespeaks caution
doctrine. See In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357,371 (3d Cir. 1993).
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tors that, from the issuer's point of view, potentially could affect
whether the forward-looking statement is realized.'5 While issuers use
their judgment to decide what is important enough to include, the de-
termination of whether a factor is "important" should be judged on a
"probability versus magnitude" basis. In other words, if the effect that
a particular factor would have on a forward-looking statement would
likely cause a significant change in the security's value, such factor
should be included."6 Although the failure to include the particular fac-
tor that ultimately causes a forward-looking statement to materially dif-
fer from its projection is not fatal to the safe harbor's protections, based
on the probability versus magnitude test, only on rare occasions would
such exception apply.
In conclusion, the SEC must realize that if it does not take action to
codify the bespeaks caution doctrine as part of its rulemaking powers,
issuers, investors, and courts will be burdened with the uncertainties of
two bodies of law. By adopting the suggestions proposed above and
thus codifying the bespeaks caution doctrine in the form of SEC Rules
or interpretive releases, problems such as the courts' misinterpreta-
tion"7 and litigation challenging the scope of the safe harbor's ambigu-
ous language can easily be avoided.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the midst of the judicial evolution of the bespeaks caution doc-
trine as a tool to dispose of frivolous securities litigation, Congress
added an overwhelming factor to the mix. In its own effort to develop
law that would end frivolous class-action and individual investor suits,
Congress codified the essence of, but not the particularities of, the be-
speaks caution doctrine. Congress expressed its approval of the doc-
trine, yet did not fully embrace its scope, leaving it instead to the courts
to further the doctrine's development while alternatively applying and
interpreting the similar, but different, legislative safe harbor.
The SEC, as the best equipped entity to prevent potential problems,
155. The Conference Committee defined "important" factors as factors that are
"relevant to the projection and ... of a nature that the factor or factors could actually affect
whether the forward-looking statement is realized." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 43-44
(1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,742-43.
156. This formulation is adopted from the test for materiality the Supreme Court set
forth in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulpher Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (1968) and adopted by the Su-
preme court in Basic Ina v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,238 n. 16 (1988), pertaining to the disclo-
sure of merger negotiations.
157. See, e.g., supra note 126 and accompanying text.
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must take action to fully codify the bespeaks caution doctrine within the
legislative safe harbor and to give a more precise meaning to the safe
harbor's ambiguous terms. Until the day when issuers, investors, and
courts are put on notice of a clear, uniform standard that will protect
forward-looking statements from liability, it is quite possible that attor-
neys once busy with securities strike suits will turn their attention to
challenging the scope of the doctrine and the safe harbor.
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